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Abstract
In England, state support for older people with disabilities consists of a national
system of non-means tested cash disability benefits, and a locally-administered
means-tested system of social care. Evidence on how the combination of the two
systems targets those in most need is lacking. We estimate a latent factor structural
equation model of disability and receipt of one or both forms of support. The
model integrates the measurement of disability and its influence on receipt of
state support, allowing for the socio-economic gradient in disability, and adopts
income and wealth constructs appropriate to each part of the model.
We find that receipt of each form of support rises as disability increases, with a
strong concentration on the most disabled, especially for LA-funded care. The
overlap between the two programmes is confined to the most disabled. Less than
half of recipients of local authority-funded care also receive a disability benefit; a
third of those in the top 10% of the disability distribution receive neither form of
support. Despite being non means-tested, disability benefits display a degree of
income and wealth targeting, as a consequence of the socio-economic gradient in
disability and likely disability benefit claims behaviour. The scope for improving
income/wealth targeting of disability benefits by means testing them, as some have
suggested, is thus less than might be expected.
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Policy points:
• Receipt of disability benefits is much higher (14%) than receipt of
publicly-funded care (3.3%) in the 65+ household population in England.
• Receipt of each form of support rises as disability rises. Within the
10% of the most disabled older people, the rate of receipt of disability
benefits is 53%; 23% receive publicly-funded social care.
• Overall, only about 50% of older recipients of publicly-funded care re-
port receipt of disability benefits. Receipt of both forms of support is
confined to the most disabled.
• A third of the 10% of most disabled older people receive neither disa-
bility benefits nor publicly-funded social care.
• Disability benefits display a degree of income and wealth targeting
without means-testing: people on low income are more likely to be
disabled and to claim their entitlement to public support.
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I. Introduction
Increasing proportions of people are reaching the ages where the need for care and
support with everyday activities becomes more likely. Worldwide, the number of
people aged 85 or over is projected to double over the next two decades (United
Nations, 2017). As a consequence many countries must decide how best to use pu-
blic resources to help people meet the needs associated with impaired functioning.
An important issue is whether state support should be focussed on those least able
to afford the cost of care via some form of means testing, or whether the need for
care alone should determine eligibility for publicly funded support.
There is a large literature on the merits of universalism versus targeting (usu-
ally through some form of means testing) in welfare programmes. Much of it con-
cerns their respective poverty/inequality reducing properties (e.g. Creedy, 1996;
van Lancker and van Mechelen, 2015). The advantages of universalism over me-
ans testing are usually considered to be weaker adverse labour supply incentives
and smaller administrative costs. The main disadvantage of universal systems is
usually assumed to be that more of a programme’s expenditure is likely to go to
those who may not be in economic need (e.g. Besley, 1990).
As described in more detail in Section II, England has a two part system
of public support for older people with disabilities: a national system of cash
disability benefits which are neither means tested nor taxable, administered by
the Department for Work and Pensions; and a means-tested system of publicly
subsidised social care administered by local government. It has sometimes been
suggested that in comparison with social care, disability benefits are not well
targeted (see e.g., Department of Health, 2009; Wanless, 2006) because they are not
means tested and hence must be received by people not in economic need. However,
in previous work we have shown that patterns of receipt of disability benefits for
older people in England mimic to some degree the effect of means testing (Hancock
et al., 2015). Descriptive analysis suggests that receipt of disability benefits and
of publicly funded social care are both inversely related to (pre-disability benefit)
income (Hancock et al., 2016).
There has been relatively little assessment of the targeting of social care in
England. A recent study, Vlachantoni et al. (2015), used wave 4 (2008) of the
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) to examine the socio-economic and
demographic factors associated with receipt of care. It found that the number of
activities of daily living (ADLs), instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs)
and mobility activities with which respondents had difficulties were the strongest
predictors of receiving publicly provided care. Income and wealth were not found
to be significantly associated with receipt of publicly provided care, which is sur-
prising given the means test.
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There is considerable policy debate on the English system of support for older
people with disabilities. Proposals for reform have included suggestions for closer
integration of the two parts of the system and/or means testing of disability be-
nefits (see e.g., Wanless, 2006; Department of Health, 2009; Commission on the
Future of Health and Social Care in England, 2014; Department for Communities
and Local Government, 2015). Decisions on potential reforms need to be informed
by good evidence on how well the two parts of the current system of support work
in combination in terms of reaching those in most need. We are not aware of any
research addressing this issue.
The first aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on means testing ver-
sus universalism, in the context of disability in later life taking the specific example
of the two-part English system in which one part (social care) is stringently means
tested while the other (cash disability benefits) is not. A second important aim
is to address difficulties in the measurement of disability and in the construction
of appropriate income measures for use in the assessment of the degree of income
targeting. We extend previous research on Attendance Allowance (Hancock et al.,
2015), adopting a similar latent variable approach to allow for the noise inherent
in self-reported indicators of disability. We exploit new data on social care which
were collected in wave 6 (2012) of ELSA, which allow us to expand the analysis
to include receipt of publicly and privately funded social care as well as disability
benefits. The analysis requires careful construction of income and wealth varia-
bles appropriate to each part of the model. Specific definitions of current income
and wealth enter the social care means test rule in a particular way, but quite
different concepts of income and wealth are relevant to the incidence and severity
of disability and the propensity to claim entitlements to public support. Section
II describes the systems of state-funded social care and disability benefits for ol-
der people operating in England. Section III reviews methods used in previous
research evaluating the targeting of disability benefits and explains our preferred
econometric approach. Its implementation is set out in Section IV. Estimation
results are presented in Section V and Section VI aids their interpretation through
post-estimation analyses. Section VII concludes.
II. Social Care and Disability Benefits for Older People
in England
England has a two part system of public support for older people with disabilities:
a national system of cash disability benefits administered by the Department for
Work and Pensions (DWP); and a local government-administered system of social
care. Disability benefits for older people consist of two main benefits: Attendance
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Allowance (AA) which can be claimed from age 65 onwards, and Disability Living
Allowance (DLA)1 which must be claimed before reaching 65 but can continue in
payment beyond 65. AA and DLA are tax-free and not means tested (although
their receipt can trigger additions to means-tested benefits). AA and DLA are
intended to contribute towards the extra living costs that disabled people face,
such as more expensive transport and the cost of help with daily living activities.
AA has two possible weekly rates: £57.30 or £85.30 from April 2018, while DLA
payments range from £22.65 to £145.35. In May 2017, there were 0.7 million DLA
recipients aged 65 and over, and 1. 2 million AA recipients in England, comprising
respectively 6% and 11% of the 65+ population.2
Publicly funded social care in England3 is organised by Local Authorities
(LAs). The system entails both a stringent disability test and a means test. Nati-
onal guidance determines the principles of the means test for people receiving care
in their own homes4 while leaving LAs discretion over some of its details. Even if
care needs are assessed as high, there is no entitlement to publicly funded social
care if total financial assets are above an upper threshold of at least £23,250 (some
LAs use higher thresholds). The local authority will require eligible disabled older
people to meet the costs of their care up to the point where disposable income
would fall below 125% of the guaranteed minimum income level, known as the
‘Guarantee Credit’ (GC), which is embodied in the means-tested benefit system;
there will be no entitlement to publicly funded social care if income is above this
level plus the cost of care that the LA assesses as required.
The reach of the social care system is much less than that of the disability
benefit system. In March 2017, the number of older people in England receiving
long-term LA social care in their own homes or in a care home was 400,300—around
4% of the total population in England aged 65+ (Health and Social Care Infor-
mation Centre, 2017). There are no administrative figures on the overlap between
the two forms of support.
1From April 2013 DLA is gradually being replaced by the Personal Independence Pay-
ment (PIP), which differs from DLA in certain details. Very few over-65s are currently
receiving PIPs.
2Source: DWP tabulator tool (https://stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk/; accessed 5 Dec 2017).
3Similar arrangements exist in Wales and Scotland but personal care in Scotland is not
means tested. In Northern Ireland social care is run by health and social care trusts.
4Although ELSA covers some people in care homes, the information collected for them
is insufficient to include them in our analysis.
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III. A coherent approach to measuring disability and
targeting of public support
Disability is a difficult concept. There are many different aspects of disability
—its physiological/psychological sources, its severity, its intermittent or persistent
nature, its incidence in relation to certain activities rather than others. Policy
analysts have struggled with this complexity (Altman, 2001; Haveman and Wolfe,
2000), but policy must necessarily impose simplicity by making a distinction bet-
ween people judged eligible for public support and others who are not.
Given the practical requirements of policy design, there are obvious advantages
in using an approach to policy analysis that works with a simple 1-dimensional
measure of disability at the individual level. Such a measure cannot be observed
directly in household surveys, but must be constructed or inferred from information
that surveys are able to provide. General self-reported measures of health status,
such as presence of diagnosed medical conditions, are limited indicators of an
individual’s functional dependence on basic tasks of everyday life (Wiener et al.,
1990) that is often the basis for determining eligibility for disability programmes.
Disability indices based on difficulties with ADLs (Katz et al., 1963) and IADLs
(Lawton and Brody, 1969) are perhaps the most widely used examples.
There is a long history of attempts to evaluate disability benefit targeting in the
research literature. One simple approach uses a single-equation framework in which
receipt of disability benefits is regressed on an assortment of disability/health
indicators (or a summary scale of them) and other characteristics found to be
relevant in influencing benefit receipt. See Banks et al. (2015) and Zantomio (2013)
as empirical examples applied to the UK context. An alternative approach uses a
two-stage method: principal component analysis (PCA) is first used to construct a
disability index as a weighted average of the set of available indicators, with weights
chosen so that the index captures as much of the covariation in the indicators as
possible. At the second stage, the constructed measure is used for analysis of the
policy response to disability and treated as if it were a directly measured variable.
The PCA approach has been used in many contexts, for instance by Poterba et al.
(2013) to measure general health in relation to wealth after retirement and by
Croda et al. (2013) to assess target efficiency of disability programs for working-
age people in Europe. It has three main drawbacks: first, the PCA approach does
not take into account the different amounts of measurement noise in each self-
reported health indicator (Bound et al., 2001). Second, using the derived PCA
disability score in a classical econometric (regression) procedure generally leads to
biased coefficient estimators (Liu, 1988). Third, the approach does not account for
unobserved variability in true health (Deaton and Paxson, 2001; Graham, 2009)
as well as in individuals’ survey reporting (Bago d’Uva et al., 2011).
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In our view, a better approach is to work with an explicit statistical model that
allows for the coarse and error-prone nature of the survey indicators of disability
and also integrates, within a comprehensive statistical framework, the two aspects
of disability measurement and outcomes at the individual level of policy on public
support for people with disabilities. The main advantage of this unified treatment
over simpler two-stage methods is that both the survey indicators of disability and
the measures of policy outcome contain information about the underlying disability
state, so that it makes fuller use of the available information relating to disability.
Our econometric approach is closely related to that proposed by e.g. Lee (1982)
and recently used by Hancock et al. (2015) and Morciano et al. (2015), in conside-
ring health status/disability as a latent concept. Suppose we have a representative
sample of individuals and let di be the unobserved degree of disability for the ith
sampled individual. We observe in the survey a set of J binary indicators of the
difficulties caused by the individual’s health condition(s): Di1, . . . DiJ .
The following measurement equations embody the assumption that the obser-
ved indicators relate to the underlying disability via a linear function involving
statistical “noise” represented by a set of mutually independent random errors
ei1, . . . eiJ :
Dij =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if λ0j + λ1jdi + eij > 0
0 otherwise
(1)
and we allow the data to determine the degree of noise, σ2j = var(eij), in each of
the survey indicators, by treating σ21 . . . σ
2
j as parameters to be estimated. The
coefficients λ11, . . . λ1J are the factor loadings, which reflect the sensitivity of each
indicator as a measure of underlying disability. Although we assume that Dij
contains binary self-reported indicators, our framework can be extended easily to
continuous and Likert-scale response indicators as well as objective measures of
health.
We specify a regression model (the disability model) of the relationship between
underlying (latent) disability di and its socio-economic determinants summarised
by a set of covariates W i:
di =W iα + ui (2)
where ui is a N(0, σ
2
d) random residual. Subject to arbitrary normalisation con-
ditions (such as λ01 = 0; λ11 = 1) required to fix the location and scale of latent
disability, a disability model comprising only (1) and (2) could be estimated by
maximum likelihood. Instead, we estimate them jointly with two further statistical
relationships linking receipt of social care and receipt of disability benefit to latent
disability, di.
We distinguish three care states: Ci = 0 indicates no receipt of social care
services; Ci = 1 indicates receipt of only private care services; and Ci = 2 indica-
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tes receipt of public care services (with or without additional privately-purchased
top-up). Conditional on the disability state di and a set of covariates Xi, the
probabilities of the two types of care receipt are given by a multinomial logit
structure:
Pr(Ci = k∣di,Xi) =
eXiβk+γkdi+ρkVi
1 + eXiβ1+γ1di+ρ1Vi + eXiβ2+γ2di+ρ2Vi
, k = 1,2. (3)
The other form of public support is disability benefit, receipt of which is indi-
cated by the binary variable Bi. Conditional on disability di and a further set of
covariates Zi, the probability of benefit receipt is specified as a logistic regression:
Pr(Bi = 1∣di,Zi) =
eZiδ+θdi+Vi
1 + eZiδ+θdi+Vi
. (4)
We allow for residual correlation between equations (3) and (4) by including
the latent N(0,1) variable Vi to represent unobserved factors (such as access to
informal support, attitudes to dependency, ability to negotiate the claims process)
linking receipt of formal care and disability benefits. Without loss of generality, the
coefficient of Vi in (4) is set to unity as an arbitrary normalization to identify the
structure. Equations (1-4) are estimated simultaneously. Our approach therefore
differs from the approach used by Poterba et al. (2010a,b, 2013) and Croda et al.
(2013), where a PCA is used to derive a latent index which a) accounts neither
for measurement errors nor for the socio-economic -health gradient; and b) is used
as exogenous covariate in a subsequent model of the outcome of interest. From
a strict statistical viewpoint, if the model is correctly specified, it is preferable to
estimate the measurement equation jointly with the outcome regression, and there
is no need to estimate the latent variable separately.
IV. Data and implementation of the statistical model
We use data from wave 6 (May 2012-June 2013) of ELSA. ELSA is a nationally
representative survey collecting data on health, disability, financial circumstances
and well-being of people aged 50 and over (‘core members’) and their partners
living in private households in England.5 Fieldwork began in 2002 and sample
members have been re-interviewed at two-yearly intervals since then. The original
5ELSA is the result of collaboration between the University College London, the In-
stitute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), and the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen).
The universities of Cambridge, Exeter and East Anglia provided expert advice on specific
modules. Many of the health measures adopted in ELSA are comparable with those in the
Health and Retirement Survey conducted in the US (Banks and Smith, 2012) and the Sur-
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ELSA cohort, interviewed in 2002/3, was drawn from households who responded
to the 1998, 1999 and 2001 cross-sectional Health Survey for England (HSE).
Refreshment cohorts drawn from later HSEs were added to the original ELSA
sample to ensure the study continued to cover the youngest age group and to
address attrition at older ages.
Wave 6 of ELSA included new questions on receipt of, and payment for, social
care, which were originally developed for use in the HSE (Balarajan et al., 2009;
Blake et al., 2010; Curtis and Burns, 2015). They improve on questions in previous
ELSA waves, distinguishing more clearly between respondents who receive social
care with financial support from a Local Authority and those who rely on care
purchased privately. The new questions follow modules on health and disability;
questions on receipt of disability benefits appear later still in the questionnaire.
The social care and disability benefit questions are thus not vulnerable to the
“justification bias” that can arise if questions on receipt of public support for
disability precede those on disability (Crossley and Kennedy, 2002). The new
data allow us to estimate the gross cost of social care received, which is important
in calculating an individuals liability (and ability) to pay for their care.
Like the earlier versions, the new social care questions are asked only of people
who report difficulties with ADLs or IADLs. In contrast, receipt of disability
benefits is asked of all respondents even if they report no ADL/IADL difficulties.
An assumption that people who report no ADL/IADL difficulties do not receive
social care might bias our results towards a conclusion that publicly funded social
care is better targeted than disability benefits: there would apparently be no
‘leakage’ of social care spending to those who report no disabilities. However, we
analysed the 2011 and 2012 HSEs which included the same social care questions
but asked of all sample members aged 65 and over and found that less than 2%
of the sample receiving LA-supported care reported no ADL/IADLs difficulties.6
Moreover, the reach of LA-funded social care observed in ELSA is comparable
with administrative figures: of the over-65 non care-home population, about 3.2%
received LA-supported care in 2012.
1. Sample selection
Our analysis focuses on the 65+ population as programmes for this age group have
been at the centre of policy debate. This age restriction also has the advantage of
vey of Health and Retirement in Europe (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2005). See documentation
at http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/ for a fuller description.
6In this paper we use ELSA rather than HSE because ELSA offers a larger sample size
and collects fuller income information.
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reducing the potential for endogeneity whereby for working-age adults the availa-
bility of disability benefits and publicly-subsidised social care could reduce labour
supply and earnings, and hence pre-benefit income. Respondents with missing va-
lues for variables included in the analysis were excluded resulting in a total sample
size of 5,125 (corresponding to about 97% of the total sample of core members
aged 65+ interviewed in wave 6). The ELSA sample is affected by non-response
in the HSE, initial refusal to take part in ELSA and cumulative attrition after
initial participation in ELSA (Bridges et al., 2015). We therefore apply the ELSA
sample weights to mitigate the bias that could result from such non response.
2. Disability measurement equations
The binary disability indicatorsDj are derived from questions on mobility, strength
and dexterity; and on difficulties with ADLs/IADLs. These questions have been
used in previous ELSA-based studies (Banks et al., 2015; Ermisch, 2014; Vlachan-
toni et al., 2015; Hancock et al., 2015). We also include indicators of the presence
of housing adaptations to help meet disability needs and of whether respondents
had poor eyesight, hearing problems or any visible physical or mental impairment
as assessed by the survey interviewer. Although ELSA includes objective physical
and cognitive functioning tests, and a range of biomarkers, we do not exploit them
here to limit potential bias associated with non-random consent to these tests7.
Table A.1 in the Appendix A provides the full list of 30 indicators used in the
measurement equations, together with their means and standard errors.
3. Latent disability equation
In the latent disability equation, the covariates W i represent all the major influ-
ences on later-life disability. As far as possible they should capture circumstances
and resources over the life-course that may affect current health including diag-
nosed health conditions and socio-economic and demographic factors. We include
in W i indicators of diagnosed physical conditions (such as stroke, cancer, lung
7Physical examination and performance data (e.g. walking speed and tests on cognitive
function) are affected by relevant and non-ignorable item non-response. About 15% of our
sample did not complete the first and the second walking tests. The reach of disability
benefits (B) and LA-supported care (C2) was higher among those who did not undertake
the test (B = 32.4%; C2 = 12.5%) than among performers (B = 9.2%; C2 = 0.1%). Cognitive
tests were impaired/not performed for about 15.6% of our sample, with the receipt of B
and C2 higher among those who did not perform the tests. Similar patterns occurred in
the comparison of those who did and did not participate in the nurse visit through which
biomarkers were collected.
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disease, asthma, arthritis and osteoporosis), chronic cognitive conditions (such as
Parkinson, Alzheimer, dementia and other cognitive degenerative disorders) and
cardio-vascular diseases (such as heart problems, diabetes, cholesterol, angina and
high blood pressure). Diagnosed conditions are included in W i rather than in Dj
as it is generally accepted that chronic conditions are potential causes of functio-
nal disability rather than measures of functional disability (Johnson and Wolinsky,
1993; Verbrugge and Jette, 1994).
Early-life living standards and parental socio-economic status are known to in-
fluence individuals accumulation of advantage or disadvantage in socio-economic
status and health (Currie, 2009). We therefore include in W i indicators of the
respondent’s father’s economic status when the respondent was 14 years old: whet-
her he worked in casual jobs; was economically inactive, unemployed or prevented
from working by disability; and if economically active whether or not he was in
a managerial, professional or technical job or running his own business. W i also
includes the respondent’s age on leaving education and a dummy variable indi-
cating whether receiving or expecting to receive either an employer pension or a
personal/private pension.
The income and wealth variables included in W i are specified to capture li-
fetime economic resources. Wealth includes financial, net primary housing and
physical (other properties, businesses and other physical assets) wealth. Income
comprises income from pensions and investments (interests, rent, dividends, pri-
vate pensions, annuities) and earnings, net of income taxes and housing costs.
Disability-related benefits (whose receipt is clearly determined by disability rather
than being an influence on disability) and means-tested benefits (where entitlement
depends on other current income and wealth) are excluded. Income and wealth
variables totalled for the household and then ascribed to each household member,
are expressed per capita in constant 2015 prices. Additional personal characte-
ristics included in W i are age, gender and current partnership status (married or
cohabiting versus single).
4. Receipt of care and disability benefit equations
We identify disability benefit recipients as respondents who reported receiving
either AA or DLA. Recipients of LA-funded care are defined as those who reported
that a LA contributed towards the cost of their social care and the estimated gross
cost of their social care was greater than the contribution that was made by the
individual or family towards the cost. Appendix B details how we estimate the
gross cost of social care received by respondents and the contribution to its cost
made by a LA.
Receipt of public social care and disability benefits is determined partly by
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claim behaviour and partly by eligibility rules and their administration. Eligible
individuals may fail to claim because, for example, they think a claim would be
unsuccessful, there are costs associated with claiming, they lack the skills to navi-
gate the claim system or they fear stigmatization. Although these factors are not
observable directly, there are variables known to be associated with claim behavi-
our which can be included in Xi and Zi in the semi-reduced form equations (3)
and (4). Following previous relevant work (Zantomio, 2013; Hernandez and Pud-
ney, 2007; Pudney et al., 2006) we include, as likely influences on claim behaviour,
age, gender, current partnership status (married or cohabiting versus single), age
left education and whether the respondent is a social renter. The last of these is
intended in part to capture contact with the welfare system which may increase
propensity to claim entitlements to social care or disability benefits.
In addition to the means test, income also influences individual decisions to ap-
ply to Local Authorities for social care, since the ability to self-finance is strongly
related to current income. We construct the vector X in a way that approxi-
mates the effect of the means test super-imposed on claim behaviour. Therefore,
in addition to socio-demographic variables listed above, the vector X contains
indicators of whether the respondent meets each of the income and assets compo-
nents of the means test and if not, how far their income or assets are above the
corresponding threshold. An individual is calculated to meet the income test if
Y − c ≤ 1.25GC, with Y representing assessable income and c an estimate of the
gross cost of care received. Assessable income differs from the measure of income
included in W because it includes disability-related and means-tested benefits.
The test on financial assets (F ) is based on whether the net per-capita amount of
financial assets reported by the respondent and any partner falls below £23,250.8
Where respondents had income or assets above the relevant thresholds, we
computed measures of the distances from these thresholds as follows:
Income: (Y − c − 1.25GC)/(c + 1.25GC) if Y − c > 1.25GC ; 0 otherwise
Assets: (F − 23,250)/23,250 if F > 23,250 ; 0 otherwise.
(5)
Further details of the construction of these measures and the gross cost of care,
c, are included in Appendix B. Locally weighted regressions of the probability
of receiving LA-subsidised care by the degree to which respondent appears to be
beyond the means test thresholds are given in Appendix Figures B.1 and B.2. They
8In practice the income test can be more complicated in the case of couples with
LAs having some discretion over how couples are assessed. Appendix B presents some
sensitivity analysis of the form of assessment for couples but the effects on the main
econometric results presented in Section V were found to be negligible.
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suggest that we are able to simulate the income test quite well (the empirical rate
of LA-funded care receipt is virtually zero above the threshold), but the asset test
is harder to simulate accurately. This could be due to measurement problems with
self-reported measures of wealth. But LAs have some discretion in implementing
national guidance on the means test, and it is possible that they make more use
of that discretion in the assets test than in the income test.
The absence of a means test for disability benefits implies that in equation (4)
income influences benefit receipt primarily through the incentive to claim, and the
income effect therefore operates in a smoother way than for receipt of LA-funded
social care. Construction of the covariate vector Zi reflects this, with pre-disability
benefit income (net of income taxes and housing costs) and financial wealth entered
as continuous variables.
Rates of receipt of public support and mean values for elements of W i, Xi
and Zi are given in Appendix Table A.2.
V. Estimation results
Factor loading estimates for equations (1) are plotted in Figure 1 with their 95%
confidence intervals. They represent the effect of latent disability on each disa-
bility indicator. All factor loadings have the expected positive sign, meaning
that higher underlying disability generates more reported difficulties with mobi-
lity, strength and dexterity, limitations in (I)ADLs and so on. They are also all
statistically significant at the 1% level, most of them very strongly. The factor
loading for the self-reported disability indicators are generally larger than those
for the interviewer reported measures. The largest factor loadings are for activities
requiring mobility/strength, bathing, preparing hot meals and shopping.
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FIGURE 1
Factor loadings and 95% CIs of the measurement model for latent disability
walking 100 yards
sitting 2 hours
getting up from chair
climbing several flights of stairs
climbing one flight of stairs
stooping, kneeling or crouching
reaching or extending arms
pulling or pushing large objects
lifting or carrying weights
picking up 5p coin from table
ADL: dressing
ADL: walking across a room
ADL: bathing or showering
ADL: eating
ADL: getting in and out of bed
ADL: using the toilet
IADL: using map
IADL: recognising when in danger
IADL: preparing a hot meal
IADL: shopping for groceries
IADL: making telephone calls
IADL: communication
IADL: taking medications
IADL: doing work around house
IADL: managing money
poor eyesight*
hard of hearing*
visible physical impairment*
visible mental impairment*
has adaptations in property
0 .25 .5 .75 1 1.25
Factor loading
Notes: the factor loading associated with “walking 100 yards” is constrained to be one
to normalise the scale of the continuous latent variable. Constraining alternative factor
loadings yielded virtually identical results. (∗) indicator constructed using the interviewer’s
report (see text for details).
Structural parameters for the latent disability equation (equation 2) are re-
ported in the first column of Table 1. The presence of a degenerative cognitive
condition such as Parkinson, Alzheimer and dementia increases the latent disabi-
lity index (d) by 3.01 standard deviation units whereas the presence of physical
conditions such as stroke, cancer, lung disease, asthma, arthritis/osteoporosis pro-
duces an estimated increase of the latent index of about 1.04. Suffering from
cardiovascular diseases produces an increase of 0.61 standard deviation units in d.
Latent disability increases significantly with age and it is higher for single pe-
ople than for those who are married or cohabiting. It is also higher for women than
men. The estimated effects on disability of early-life living standards as measured
by father’s socio-economic status, own education, home-ownership, membership of
private pension plans, income and financial wealth all contribute to a consistent
picture of a socio-economic gradient in disability.
The second and third columns of Table 1 show estimates of the effects of
covariates on the log odds of receipt of privately funded care (column 2) and
LA-funded care (column 3) as opposed to non-receipt of care. Disability level,
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age, education and satisfying the income component of the means test all exert
positive influences on being a care recipient. The effects of disability and satisfying
the income test are both larger for receipt of LA-funded care than for receipt of
only privately-funded care whereas the effects of age and education are smaller
for LA-funded care. Living with a partner reduces the odds of receiving care
rather than no care but more so for LA-funded care than for privately-funded
care. Having assets above the means test threshold reduces the odds of being in
receipt of either form of care but the coefficient estimate is statistically significant
for only privately-funded care. The extent to which assets exceed the means test
threshold does not have a statistically significant effect on receipt of privately
paid-for or LA-funded care. We found no significant gender or housing tenure
effects at conventional levels of statistical significance.
Estimates of the parameters of equation (4) for receipt of disability benefits,
are reported in the final column of Table 1. Latent disability has a dominant
positive effect on receipt of disability benefits, as we would expect. But other
coefficients suggest the existence of further important determinants. Income and
wealth both have significant negative effects on benefit receipt despite the absence
of means-testing and we interpret this as evidence of strong economic incentive
effects on the propensity to claim benefit. The strong positive coefficient for being
a social renter is a common finding in studies of take-up behaviour and we have
previously argued that this is likely to be related to access to advisory and support
services that many social landlords offer. The negative impact of education and
female gender are also typical findings, although the explanation for them is less
clear. In contrast to receipt of care, neither age nor cohabitation is significantly
associated with receipt of disability benefits.
We find evidence of positive correlation between receipt of care services and
disability benefits. The estimated cross-equation coefficients ρ1 and ρ2 are highly
significant for both categories of care, suggesting there are indeed unobservable
factors influencing receipt of both types of support. The correlation between di-
sability benefit receipt and privately purchased care is slightly higher than the
correlation between disability benefits and LA-funded care.
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TABLE 1
Structural parameters of the latent disability equation and for receipt of social care and disability benefits (AA/DLA)
Latent Receipt of care Receipt of
disability private payers LA supported disability benefits
Latent disability index 0.494*** 0.726*** 0.543***
Diagnosed cognitive conditions (1=yes,0=no) 3.007***
Diagnosed physical conditions (1=yes,0=no) 1.039***
Diagnosed cardio-vascular diseases (1=yes,0=no) 0.613***
Age in years 0.143*** 0.114*** 0.076*** -0.012
Married or cohabiting -0.456*** -1.297*** -1.530*** -0.081
Female 0.858*** 0.304 0.011 -0.378***
Age left education (in years) -0.194*** 0.266*** 0.234*** -0.090**
Main father’s job when respondent aged 14 (1=yes,0=no):
casual jobs, retired, unemployed, sick/disabled 0.483**
manager or senior official, self-employer -0.053
Rights in private/employer pension scheme(s) -0.481***
Home owner (1=yes,0=no) -1.257***
Social renter (1=yes,0=no) -0.152 0.168 0.672***
Per capita net wealth (£’00,000) -0.094***
Per capita original income (£’000) -0.114**
Income test met (1=yes,0=no) 0.528** 1.294***
Proportional distance above income test threshold -0.285 -1.042**
Assets above the means test threshold (1=yes,0=no) -0.412* -0.299
Proportional distance above asset means test threshold 0.022 -0.141
Per-capita net pre-disability income (£’000) -0.263**
Per-capita net financial wealth (£’00,000) -0.429***
Constant -18.158*** -18.643*** -6.449***
Variance σ2d 10.358***
Covariance parameter ρj 0.969*** 0.882*** 1
Notes: Observations: 5,125. Significance level: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
Goodness of fit statistics: Log-likelihood: -37495.99; Degree of freedom: 106; AIC: 75203.99; BIC: 75897.43.
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To aid interpretation of the estimated equations for receipt of care and benefits,
Figures 2 and 3 plot how the average predicted probabilities of receipt of disability
benefits and care vary according to predicted disability (d̂) and original income
(measured before disability and means-tested benefits) respectively. For this pur-
pose, we group sample members into deciles of predicted latent disability9 and of
income. Figure 2 illustrates three main points. Firstly, predicted receipt of all
forms of support is negligible in the lowest 30-40% of the distribution of estimated
disability but rises thereafter. Secondly, from the 30th to 40th percentiles of disa-
bility, predicted receipt of disability benefits starts to rise and increasingly exceeds
predicted receipt of either publicly funded or privately purchased care. Thirdly,
predicted receipt of privately purchased care is higher than receipt of LA-funded
care until somewhere between the 9th and 10th decile so that it is only at the very
highest disability levels that more people receive LA-funded care than purchase
care exclusively privately. There is thus a very strong concentration of publicly
funded care on those with the highest levels of disability.
FIGURE 2
Average predicted probabilities of care and disability benefit receipt by decile of latent
disability
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9For comparison, the median number of mobility (including strength and dexterity)
difficulties and ADL limitations reported in the lowest 30% of d̂ is 0. In the 4th and 5th
deciles of d̂, the median number of mobility difficulties reported rise to one; to 2 (5) in the
6th (8th) decile. In the 10th decile of d̂, the median number of mobility difficulties reported
is 8 (over 10) whereas the median number of ADL limitation reported is 3 (over 6).
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As we would expect given the means test, predicted receipt of LA-funded care
falls with income (Figure 3). A very striking feature of Figure 3 is the sharp
fall in the average predicted probability of receiving disability benefits as income
rises, despite the fact that disability benefits are not means-tested. Also of note
is the fall in predicted probability of purchasing care privately as income rises.
Underlying both of these observations is the (negative) socio-economic gradient of
disability which is captured in the structural equations approach. In the case of
privately purchased care, the restriction of LA-funded care to those who not only
have low means but also have high disability is likely to result in people with lower
but still substantial levels of disability having to purchase care themselves. Given
the socio-economic gradient of disability, they will typically have lower incomes
and assets than those with no or low levels of disability.
In summary, we found evidence of considerable targeting, by disability and in-
come, of each of the two systems of public support for older people with disabilities.
Our estimates predict that at all levels of disability and income, the probability
of receipt of disability benefits is higher than that for LA-funded care. However,
the rate at which that probability falls as income rises appears to be higher for
disability benefits than for LA-funded care, despite the stringent means test for
the latter and no means test for the former.
FIGURE 3
Average predicted probabilities of care and disability benefit receipt by decile of income
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FIGURE 4
Observed rates of receipt of cash-disability benefits, LA-funded care and both by decile
of latent disability
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VI. Interpretation of results
In this section we extend our use of the predicted disability levels and receipt of
support to shed more light on the workings of the dual system of support for older
people with disabilities.
Using the predicted disability level, d̂, we can see that the observed rates of both
care and disability benefits are zero below the 4th decile of disability (Figure 4).
Sample members start to receive disability benefits at the 4th decile of disability
where receipt is about 3.5%. No sample members report receipt of LA-funded
care below the median level of disability and at the median level just 0.4% are
recipients. Receipt of LA-funded care rises to about 3.2% at the 8th decile of
predicted disability. At that point the observed rate of disability benefits is much
higher at about 19%.
Each programme seems well targeted towards more disabled older people. Ra-
tes of receipt of each rise significantly in the top 20% of disability. Within the 10%
of the most disabled individuals, the rate of receipt of disability benefits is 53%
and 23% receive LA-funded care.
Given the stringent disability and means tests that apply to publicly funded
social care, and the much higher overall rate of receipt of disability benefits, it is
not surprising that relatively few recipients of disability benefits (around 11%) also
receive publicly funded care. A more surprising finding is that the proportion of
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recipients of publicly funded care who also receive disability benefits is under one
half (49%). Even among the 10% of most disabled people, only 60% of the 23%
who receive publicly funded social care also receive disability benefits. Moreover
some 33% of older people in the top 10% of disability receive neither form of
support.
In Figure 5, we compare the implications of the estimated models, for four
illustrative individuals aged 73 (the median age observed in the sample), for a
spectrum of disability levels that correspond to the median values of d̂ observed in
each decile. Each of the individuals has left school at 14 which was the minimum
school leaving age allowed at the time, with income and financial asset set at
125% of the GC level and at the upper capital threshold respectively. Two of the
cases are women living with their partners. One is a homeowner (case A) and
one is a social renter (case B). The two other cases are widows living alone: a
homeowner (case C ) and a social renter (case D). A number of points emerge
from these comparisons. First, other things equal, being a social renter increases
the predicted probability of receiving disability benefits but has little effect on
the probability of receiving LA-funded care. On the other hand, living alone has
virtually no effect on the predicted probability of receiving disability benefits but
does increase the probability of receiving LA-funded support.
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FIGURE 5
Predicted probabilities of cash-disability benefits and LA-funded care by level of
disability for two benchmark cases
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Case B: partnered, social renter
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In Figure 6, we examine how the estimated probability of receiving support
varies by income level for a widow who is a social renter (case D above), with
either a high or a median level of disability, corresponding to the median values of
d̂ observed in the 10th and 5th deciles of its distribution. Below 125% of GC, the
predicted rates of receipt when disability is high is about 26% for LA-funded care
and approximately two-thirds for disability benefits. Because of the means-test,
the predicted probability of receiving LA-funded care drops sharply after the 125%
of GC threshold to close to zero. Despite the absence of a means test for disability
benefits, their predicted rate of receipt also declines as income rises. The strict
disability test for publicly funded care means that predicted receipt is virtually
zero at all levels of income when disability at the median level. Predicted rates of
disability benefit receipt are much lower than for the high disability case but still
fall slightly as income rises.
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FIGURE 6
Predicted probabilities of cash-disability benefits and LA-funded care by income for a
73-year old social renter widow
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VII. Conclusions
Much of the previous literature on the design of disability programmes considers
working-age adults, where labour market attachment is a primary concern (Burk-
hauser et al., 2014; Bound and Burkhauser, 1999, see e.g.) and is the focus of
policy reforms. Instead, our interest here is in older people, typically well beyond
retirement age, and in programmes that address care needs and the personal costs
of disability, rather than act as earnings replacement.
This paper is motivated by the considerable policy debate on the respective
roles of the English cash disability benefit and social care systems in providing
help for older people with care needs, including suggestions for integrating the
two systems. In November 2017, the UK Government announced that it plans
to consult on proposals to reform care and support for older people via a Green
paper to be published in Summer 201810. This is the most recent in a long line
of attempts to identify reform options for the English system of support for older
people with care needs (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1996; Royal Commission
on Long Term Care of the Elderly, 1999; Wanless, 2006; Department of Health,
10https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-set-out-proposals-to-reform-
care-and-support
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2009; Commission on Funding Care and Support, 2011; Commission on the Future
of Health and Social Care in England, 2014). Any proposals for reform of the
systems need to draw on good evidence on how well the current systems, taken
together, are targeted on those in most need. In this paper, we have therefore
investigated the targeting properties of the English two-part system of support
for older people with disabilities. We have extended previous research in four
ways. First, we consider both parts of the system in contrast to previous research
looking only at disability benefits (Hancock et al., 2015; Zantomio, 2013) or only
social care receipt (Vlachantoni et al., 2015). Secondly, our statistical approach
integrates the measurement of disability and its influence on receipt of each type
of state support in a single framework, allowing for the socio-economic gradient
in disability, whereas previous literature has used simple discrete indicators of
disability and single equation frameworks. Thirdly, we have adopted definitions
of income and wealth appropriate to each part of the statistical model. This may
explain why we find significant income and wealth influences on receipt of publicly
subsidised social care where Vlachantoni et al. (2015) found none. Finally, we have
also been able to exploit newly available data on social care collected in wave 6
(2012) of ELSA which enables us to distinguish better between those who receive
publicly subsidised care and those who pay the full cost of care.
We find that receipt of each of disability benefits and LA-funded care rises
as disability increases (a finding consistent with previous research), with a strong
concentration on those with the highest levels of disability, more so for LA-funded
care than for disability benefits. The overlap between the two programmes occurs
entirely among the most disabled population. It is striking that less than half
of recipients of local authority-funded care also receive a disability benefit, while
amongst those in the top 10% of the disability distribution, a third receive neither
form of support. As we would expect given the means test, receipt of LA-funded
care falls as income rises. As we have found in previous research using different
data (Hancock et al., 2015), there is also considerable income and wealth targeting
of disability benefits, even though they are not means tested. This is explained
partly by the socio-economic gradient in disability but is also likely to reflect
claim behaviour. The scope for improving income/wealth targeting of disability
benefits by means testing them, as some have suggested, is thus less than might
be expected.
Under a two part system, the chance of a disabled person being awarded at least
some support is likely to be greater than under a single system given the need to
make a claim and the inevitable judgements involved by system administrators in
disability assessment. The limited overlap in receipt of the two forms of support
suggests that combining them into a single system risks increasing the already
substantial proportion of the most disabled older people who receive neither form
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of support.
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics
TABLE A.1
Means and standard errors (s.e.) for the binary indicators of disability (1=has difficulty,
0=does not have difficulty)
mean s.e.
Mobility: difficulty walking 100 yards 20.31% 0.402
Mobility: difficulty sitting 2 hours 14.48% 0.352
Mobility: difficulty getting up from chair after sitting long periods 30.32% 0.460
Mobility: difficulty climbing several flights stairs without resting 43.56% 0.496
Mobility: difficulty climbing one flight stairs without resting 22.39% 0.417
Mobility: difficulty stooping, kneeling or crouching 46.50% 0.499
Mobility: difficulty reaching or extending arms above shoulder level 14.42% 0.351
Mobility: difficulty pulling or pushing large objects 24.12% 0.428
Mobility: difficulty lifting or carrying weights over 10 pounds 30.97% 0.462
Mobility: difficulty picking up 5p coin from table 8.07% 0.272
ADL: difficulty dressing, including putting on shoes and socks 16.42% 0.370
ADL: difficulty walking across a room 5.19% 0.222
ADL: difficulty bathing or showering 13.24% 0.339
ADL: difficulty eating, such as cutting up food 3.29% 0.178
ADL: difficulty getting in and out of bed 6.99% 0.255
ADL: difficulty using the toilet, including getting up or down 4.28% 0.202
IADL: difficulty using map to figure out how to get around strange place 6.73% 0.251
IADL: recognising when in physical danger (wave 4 onwards) 2.04% 0.141
IADL: difficulty preparing a hot meal 6.94% 0.254
IADL: difficulty shopping for groceries 13.86% 0.346
IADL: difficulty making telephone calls 3.55% 0.185
IADL: difficulty with communication (wave 4 onwards) 5.42% 0.226
IADL: difficulty taking medications 3.19% 0.176
IADL: difficulty doing work around house and garden 20.64% 0.405
IADL: difficulty managing money, e.g. paying bills, keeping track expenses 5.00% 0.218
Blind or poor eyesight* 1.67% 0.128
Deaf or hard of hearing* 3.82% 0.192
Has physical impairment/illness* 1.64% 0.127
Has mental impairment, lost concentration, very nervous or anxious* 3.36% 0.180
Has adaptations in property 23.28% 0.423
Observations 5,125
Notes:∗ indicator constructed using the interviewer’s report.
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TABLE A.2
Means and standard errors (s.e.) for covariates used in the equations for latent disability,
receipt of care and receipt of disability benefits.
mean s.e.
Diagnosed cardio-vascular diseases 17.17% 0.377
Diagnosed physical conditions 12.05% 0.326
Diagnosed cognitive conditions 3.17% 0.175
Age 74.5 7.284
Cohabitation 61.66% 0.486
Women 54.58% 0.498
Age left education:
14 or under/never 19.73% 0.398
15 years old 37.38% 0.484
16 years old 18.21% 0.386
17 years old 7.33% 0.261
18 years old 5.40% 0.226
19 years old or over 11.95% 0.324
Whether home owner 80.85% 0.393
Whether is a social renter (LA or H. Ass) 14.55% 0.353
Main father’s job(a): casual jobs, retired, unemployed, sick/disabled 5.11% 0.220
Main father’s job(a): manager or senior official, self-employer 23.32% 0.423
Receiving/contributing/retained rights in a private/occupational pension(s) 67.96% 0.467
Per capita net wealth (£’00,000) 2.039 3.419
Per capita net financial wealth (£’00,000) 0.371 0.520
Per capita original (pre-disability and means-test benefits) income (£’000 pm) 1.059 1.589
Per capita (pre-disability benefits) income (£’000 pm) 1.024 0.623
Income test met 37.48% 0.484
Income ability to self-finance(b)(c) 0.850 2.463
Assets above the means test threshold 59.39% 0.491
Wealth ability to self-finance(b)(c) 4.029 11.071
Social Care received:
Do not receive care 92.75% 0.259
Private-funded 4.02% 0.196
LA-supported 3.23% 0.177
In receipt of cash disability benefits (AA/DLA) 13.92% 0.346
Observations 5,125
Notes: (a): when respondent aged 14.
ssssssss(b): Measured as proportionate distance above the means test.
ssssssss(c): Sample mean and s.e. has been computed here only among members that do not meet
ssssssssssssthe eligibility criteria.
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Appendix B. Simulating the means test for publicly fun-
ded social care
In the main text we describe the construction of covariates used in the receipt
of care equations designed to capture the effects of the income and asset tests
which determine whether someone is eligible for publicly funded social care. This
requires us to estimate the gross cost of the care received by individuals in the
sample. In this appendix we describe how this cost is estimated and also present
some sensitivity analysis for the case of couples where Local Authorities have some
discretion over how they treat joint/shared income.
1. Estimating the gross cost of care and any Local Authority con-
tribution to it
Each of five possible sources of social care were assigned an hourly cost in 2012
prices, based on data from Curtis (2013). The five sources were home care, reable-
ment, warden, cleaner, handyman. These were sources mentioned by respondents
as providing help with ADL/IADL tasks. For each type of care, respondents were
asked how many hours of care they received each week. If they were not able to
give an exact number of hours they were asked first to say in which of nine bands
of hours, the hours of care they received fell. If they could not select from these
nine bands they were then offered three bands to select from. Where respondents
could not give an exact number of hours of care, they were assigned the mid-point
of the band they selected. This number was then multiplied by the appropriate
hourly rate and aggregated across types of care to provide an estimate of the gross
cost of care received by each respondent.
Respondents were asked a series of questions which enabled us to (i) identify whet-
her a Local Authority contributed to the cost of any care they received and (ii) to
estimate the total payment that respondents or their families made towards the
cost of their care.
Where the Local Authority was identified as contributing to the cost, its contri-
bution was taken as the excess, if any, of the gross cost of care over what the
recipient (or family) paid towards their care. Recipients of LA-funded care were
then deemed to be those for whom the LA contribution to the gross cost of care
was strictly positive.
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2. Sensitivity analysis for the treatment of couples in the means
tests for social care
National guidance encourages LAs to take into account only the disabled persons
income and not those of any partner. However, they must adjust the assessment
where a partner is financially dependent on the person who is being assessed (De-
partment of Health, 2013).
Let c be the gross value of care received and YLA be the income the LA com-
pares with the means test threshold of 125% of the Guarantee Credit level. In the
case of a single person YLA = (Y − c) where Y is the individual’s disposable (after
tax and housing costs). For a partnered person the question is whether and how
the income of the partner (Y p) and the cost of any care s(he) receives (cp) is taken
into account. We allow for three possibilities:
1. LAs assess on the basis of half the total disposable income of the individual
and partner less the individuals care costs: YLA =
Y +Y p
2 − c.
2. LAs compute the total income less the total care costs and assess on the
basis of half the result: YLA =
(Y +Y p)−(c+cp)
2 .
3. LAs assess eligibility by using the lesser of individual disposable income less
care costs and the result at 2) above: YLA = min(Y − c,
(Y +Y p)−(c+cp)
2 ). In
other words the income assessment is the most favourable from the point of
view of the individual. This is the income definition used in equation 5 of
the paper.
Figure B.1 graphs the locally weighted regressions of the probability of recei-
ving LA-subsidised care on the three definitions of income as observed in the ELSA
sample. The vertical line in the graph indicates the value of the single person’s GC
level plus 25%. Receipt of LA-funded care is virtually zero above this threshold
on any of the definitions of assessable income. Below the threshold, receipt varies
only a little according to the definition used. This suggests that we are able to
capture the income component of the means test quite well and that varying the
income definition used in constructing the corresponding covariates as defined in
equation (5) in the receipt of care model would be unlikely to have much effect on
the estimated coefficients.
Figure B.2 graphs the locally weighted regressions of the probability of re-
ceiving LA-subsidised care on the individuals’ ability to self-finance in terms of
distance from the income threshold (YLA determined using option 3 above) and
asset threshold. As one would expect, the dispersion on the financial dimension is
far higher that the dispersion in income.
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FIGURE B.1
Simulating means-test of LA-funded care
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FIGURE B.2
Receipt of publicly funded care by distance from the means test thresholds
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